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An individual is liable for patent infringement if he infringes one
or more patented claims either directly under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) or
indirectly under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) or § 271(c). In 2012, the Federal
Circuit clarified its interpretation of § 271(b) and § 271(c) in the case
of Akamai v. Limelight. However, the court failed to address issues of
“divided” direct infringement, where two or more entities combine and
together complete each and every step of a method claim, but no single
entity does all of the steps. This Note walks through the history of the
judicial interpretation of §§ 271(b) and (c) up until Akamai v. Lime-
light, discusses the decision itself, and acknowledges the accompanying
criticism. This Note proposes a reformed test for cases of divided in-
fringement: a finding of divided direct infringement should be a prereq-
uisite for §§ 271(b) and (c) liability, but divided direct infringement
liability under § 271(a) should not be possible absent the alleged in-
fringer meeting the single entity rule.
INTRODUCTION
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), an individual is liable for direct infringement
if he “makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States.”1 Direct infringement requires a showing that at least one claim of
the patent has been infringed.2 Method claims, a specific type of patent
claim, are generally a series of steps that performs some function or accom-
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University of Michigan Law School, 2014 J.D. (expected). The author would like to thank
Liza Roe, Carlyn Williams, Helen Ji, Jason Wong, Michael Wueste and Steven Beigelmacher
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1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
2. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“To prove direct infringement, the plaintiff must establish by a prepon-
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plishes some result.3 For direct infringement of method claims, each and
every step of the claimed method must be performed by the actor in order to
engender liability for that actor.4 In contrast, the doctrine of indirect in-
fringement requires one of two acts to create liability for an actor – either by
(1) inducing another to directly infringe, as codified in 35 U.S.C § 271(b) or
(2) contributing to another’s direct infringement in some way, such as sup-
plying a component which constitutes a material part of the invention, as in
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).5 “Indirect infringement” is an umbrella term for the par-
allel doctrines of inducement and contributory infringement.
Until recently, courts have required direct infringement to occur under
the direction or control of a single entity in order for an actor to be liable for
indirect infringement.6 However, in August of 2012, the Federal Circuit de-
livered its decision in the case of Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc.7 In a 5-4 en banc decision to overturn its own precedent of
BMC v. Paymentech,8 the court eliminated this single entity rule for indirect
infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271 (b) and (c).9 Thus, liability for
§ 271(b) and § 271(c) is no longer premised on a single actor infringing a
patent under § 271(a).10 Rather, liability under § 271(b) can now attach in
the absence of § 271(a) direct infringement.11
A key tension in indirect infringement cases—and cases of software in-
direct infringement, in particular—is how best to “[confine] the protection of
the law exclusively to the invention or discovery covered by the patent
grant.”12 With that goal in mind, a crucial requirement of indirect infringe-
ment, under either § 271(b) or § 271(c), should be that the patentee is
granted the full measure of protection afforded by the laws — no more, and
no less.
derance of the evidence that one or more claims of the patent read on the accused device
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
3. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“A process is a mode of treat-
ment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”).
4. E.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“In the context of a method claim, that means the accused infringer must perform
all the steps of the claimed method, either personally or through another acting under his
direction or control.”).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
6. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (estab-
lishing the single entity rule).
7. Akamai, 692 F.3d.
8. BMC Res., 498 F.3d 1373.
9. Akamai, 692 F.3d.
10. Id. at 1333 “([T]he majority does not require proof of direct infringement, but holds
that the entity that advises or enables or recommends the divided infringement is fully respon-
sible for the consequences of the direct infringement.”).
11. Id.
12. Note, Section 271(b) of the Patent Act of 1952: Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J.
132, 141 (1956).
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This Note examines the changing doctrine of indirect infringement and
its effect upon the courts, and in particular, patented software. Part I of this
Note presents an overview of the judicial application of the indirect infringe-
ment doctrine before and after the 1952 Patent Act, both by the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Part II illustrates the various policies behind
interpretative changes to the doctrines through the lens of amici curae filings
in Akamai. Part III analyzes the en banc decision of Akamai, its effect on
precedent, and the separate path for the doctrine articulated in one dissent.
Part IV proposes an alternative for the future of the doctrine in light of the
decision of Akamai, while remaining cognizant that a future Supreme Court
decision on this case is likely.13 In particular, this Note argues that loopholes
presently existing in the doctrine allowing software firms to avoid infringe-
ment of method patents should be closed in a different manner than that
advocated by the Federal Circuit in Akamai.14 In general, divided direct in-
fringement should not give rise to liability in the absence of meeting the
single entity rule under BMC, but a finding of divided direct infringement
should be a prerequisite for a finding of liability under § 271(b) or § 271(c).
This approach would protect the potential economic value of software pat-
ents, keep case law in line with precedent and statutory meaning, and pre-
vent innocent third party infringers (i.e., end users of software) from being
liable for damages.
I. THE DOCTRINE — PAST AND PRESENT
Generally, indirect infringement creates a cause of action for activity
that knowingly leads to a third party infringing a patent.15 This gives the
patentee “a valuable device for preventing competitors from destroying his
legal monopoly.”16 In the traditional era of component patents, the tools of
precedent were enough for courts to deal with direct and indirect infringe-
ment.17 However, as the line between patentable and unpatentable subject
matter continued to erode and software began to ease into the realm of pat-
entability,18 courts began to confront computer-related patents for the first
13. See, e.g., Daniel A. Devito et al., Federal Circuit Clarifies Standard for Induced
Infringement of Method Claims, SKADDEN (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.skadden.com/insights/
federal-circuit-clarifies-standard-induced-infringement-method-claims (“A petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court is a virtual certainty, and there is a good chance that it will be
accepted given the attention these cases have garnered and the heavily divided en banc
decision.”).
14. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306, (“[W]e find that these cases and cases like them can be
resolved through an application of the doctrine of induced infringement.”).
15. Note, supra note 12, at 132.
16. Id.
17. See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74  (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100); Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
18. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (writing that patentable
subject matter includes “anything under the sun that is made by man.”).
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time. Still, without certain hardware advances, the software aspect of many
infringement cases could be set aside—software was still intrinsically tied to
the hardware it ran on.19 Eventually, as hardware became more unspecial-
ized, software could be more generally written to affect a variety of plat-
forms.20 Consequently, software could no longer be as easily ignored in an
infringement analysis. This, combined with a further increase in the scope of
patentable subject matter as well as the Internet boom, led to interactive
software method patents taking center stage. In the years prior to Akamai,
the Federal Circuit would wrestle with how best to apportion liability for
infringement of these interactive methods.
A. The Doctrine Prior to the 1952 Patent Act
The two brothers-in-arms indirect infringement doctrines of inducement
and contributory infringement originated in a decision from the 1800s, Wal-
lace v. Holmes.21 The Wallace court held that two separate individuals could
infringe a combination patent when they each manufactured a separate com-
ponent of the patented invention.22 The controversy in Wallace involved a
patent on a two-piece lamp and two alleged infringers.23 One alleged in-
fringer manufactured only the chimney; the other infringer manufactured
only the burner.24 Each of these components had no use outside of the
claimed lamp structure.25 The court rebuked the notion that the alleged in-
fringers could escape liability: “[i]t cannot be, that, where a useful machine
is patented as a combination of parts, two or more can engage in its con-
struction and sale.”26 Otherwise, the court noted, combination patents would
be “of little value.”27
The Wallace fact pattern is typical of indirect infringement cases—two
or more infringers separately infringe one or more aspects of the patent, but
no single actor infringes the patent as a whole.28 Often, the customer com-
pletes the direct infringement by performing the final step, such as assem-
bling the components to create the entire lamp as in Wallace.29 As some
courts began to push the doctrine of contributory infringement to an illogical
19. See Part I.C.
20. See Part I.D.
21. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179-80 (1980)
(“The idea that a patentee should be able to obtain relief against those whose acts facilitate
infringement by others has been part of our law since Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F.Cas. 74 (No.
17,100) (CC Conn. 1871).”).
22. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74  (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
23. Id. at 79.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 80.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
29. Id.
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conclusion (that manufacturing and selling only an unpatented part of a com-
bination patent was infringement),30 other courts developed the doctrine of
patent misuse as a defense to charges of infringement.31 Under patent mis-
use, patentees who improperly attempted to expand the scope of their patent
in litigation could be denied relief.32 Eventually, in the case of Mercoid v.
Mid Continent, the Court expanded the doctrine of patent misuse so as to
“limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. . . . What re-
siduum may be left we need not stop to consider.”33 As a result, the Mercoid
decision effectively neutered indirect infringement.34 Because Congress
thought the doctrine of indirect infringement was important, the Mercoid
decision necessitated (in part) the 1952 Patent Act.35
The 1952 Patent Act codified the common law doctrines composing in-
direct infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 272(b) (“inducement”) and 35 U.S.C.
§ 272(c) (“contributory”). Section 271(b) of the statute states “[w]hoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”36
Congress designed this section to protect patentees.37 At the time, this sec-
tion was intended to impose liability on anyone who aided or abetted in-
fringement.38 For example, a hospital might order its doctors to perform a
medical procedure. Assuming that by doing this procedure the doctors di-
rectly infringe a medical procedure patent, the hospital would be liable for
inducing the doctors’ direct infringement. Section 271(c), which covers con-
tributory infringement, states:
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or im-
ports into the United States a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or ap-
30. See, e.g., Matthew T. Nesbitt, Comment, From Oil Lamps to Cell Phones: What the
Trilateral Offices Can Teach Us About Detangling the Metaphysics of Contributory Infringe-
ment, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 669, 677 (2007) (“The scope of contributory infringement may
have reached its zenith in Henry v. A.B. Dick, where the Supreme Court held that a patent
holder could control the supplier of components of a patented device and that using an unap-
proved component could result in contributory infringement.”).
31. Carbice Corp. of America v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-34 (1931)
(“Relief is denied because the [plaintiff] is attempting, without sanction of law, to employ the
patent to secure a limited monopoly of unpatented material used in applying the invention.”).
32. The doctrine of patent misuse was also codified in 35 U.S.C. 271(d) in the 1952
Patent Act.
33. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944).
34. Nesbitt, supra note 30, at 681 (“[O]thers believed that Mercoid rendered combina-
tion patents ineffective.”).
35. Id. at 684 (“§ 271 was meant to override the Mercoid decision and support the
validity of contributory infringement.”).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
37. Note, Section 271(b) of the Patent Act of 1952: Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J.
132, 141 (1956).
38. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at *2402 (1952) (declaring the purpose of the 1952
amendment).
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paratus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be espe-
cially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.39
Section 271(c) addressed the most common indirect infringement scenario:
components of a combination patent as seen with the Wallace lamp. With its
exceptions and explicit knowledge requirements, Congress intended
§ 271(c) to address the common Wallace scenario while correcting the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Mercoid, encouraging competition but not giving
patentees overbroad protection.40
Although most commentators view § 271(c) as a needed provision and a
mere codification of Wallace and subsequent holdings,41 § 271(b) has been
under attack since its very enactment.42 Some wrote that the section is
merely a nebulous statute which will create difficulties with deciding which
activities violate the statute.43 Others believed that it would “produce new
interpretative problems.”44 The concern regarding vagueness was not un-
founded—courts often conflate § 271(b) and § 271(c), or collapse their anal-
ysis of both into one discussion.45 These concerns were realized when courts
began to confront indirect infringement for interactive software method
patents.
B. Early Establishing Cases (1960–1980)
In this timeframe, courts began to interpret the 1952 Patent Act and its
new codifications of §§ 271(a), (b), and (c) for the first time. Early court
decisions focused primarily on situations where different entities manufac-
tured partial components, as in Wallace, and discussed § 271(c) significantly
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
40. Note, supra note 12, at 141.
41. See generally, Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of
1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1952) (discussing generally the drafting of the 1952 Patent
Act).
42. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12.
43. Id. at 138-140.
44. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 208 (1980) (quoting Con-
tributory Infringement: Hearings on H.R. 2866 Before the Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 11, 50-56 (1949)).
45. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 673
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (active inducement and contributory infringement); Met–Coil Sys. Corp. v.
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (active inducement and contribu-
tory infringement); see also, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n. 9, 125 S.Ct. 2764, the Court observed
that ‘the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability
are not clearly drawn,’ quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. 774.”).
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more than § 271(b). These cases form the bedrock of precedent which courts
would later use to examine software method patents.
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (“Aro I”)46 marked
the first time the Supreme Court considered § 271(c) after its passage.47 As
with many cases from the time, the defendant sold one component of a pat-
ented invention: the fabric for a convertible top.48 The plaintiff sold the pat-
ented convertible top as a whole.49 With normal use, the fabric was often
ruined after a few years.50 Accordingly, many users purchased new replace-
ment tops.51 In Aro I, the court was wary of extending the reach of the patent
beyond its proper scope.52 The court reasoned that “[t]he patent is for [the]
combination [of the convertible top] only. Since none of the separate ele-
ments of the combination is claimed as the invention, none of them when
dealt with separately is protected by the patent monopoly.”53 The court fur-
ther recognized that 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) simply codified a long-standing
common law precedent: “there can be no contributory infringement in the
absence of a direct infringement.”54 This aspect of the holding—without di-
rect infringement there is no indirect infringement—became a central com-
ponent of the indirect infringement doctrine after the 1952 Patent Act, in
both the § 271(b) inducement context as well as the § 271(c) contributory
infringement context.55
The case came up again after remand in what became known as Aro II,
allowing the Court to consider an important facet of indirect infringement
doctrine—mens rea.56 The majority of the Aro II court held that § 271(c)
requires a showing that “the alleged contributory infringer knew that the
combination for which his component was especially designed was both pat-
ented and infringing.”57 This differs from the mens rea knowledge standard
in direct infringement, which imposes no mens rea requirement at all, and
46. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
47. Irving Faber, Contributory Infringement – A Limited Tort, 42 Chicago-Kent L. Rev.
1, 5 (“The first case to be decided by the Supreme Court after passage of section 271 was Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.”).
48. Id. at 337-338.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 338.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 342.
53. Id. at 341.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336
(1961) and stating “[t]hat principle, that there can be no indirect infringement without direct
infringement, is well settled.”).
56. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
57. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
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thus is a strict liability tort.58 Until recently, it was unclear whether § 271(b)
carried any knowledge requirement, or, if so, the level of mens rea required.
However, based in part on the framework of Aro II, the Supreme Court con-
cluded in 2011 that § 271(b) imposes the same mens rea requirement as
§ 271(c).59 The court’s early analytical framework for combination patents
in Aro I and Aro II laid much of the precedential framework for future
software method patents and indirect infringement.
C. The Emergence of Patented Software (1980–2000)
Even as courts advanced the patentable subject matter doctrine in Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty60 and Diamond v. Diehr,61 the indirect infringement
doctrine remained relatively stable during the era of 1980-2000. Due to the
limited capability of hardware, the number of different hardware manufac-
turers, uncertain status of software as patentable subject matter, and the
straightforward nature of a traditional Aro component-based analysis, courts
did not have a reason to consider the complications of software. Without
general purpose hardware, complicated software could not be directed to a
wide array of different hardware platforms, and software patents were nar-
rowly directed to a specific hardware platform.62 This specificity in hard-
ware made it easier for courts to ignore the software present. For example,
Ralph Baer, the father of video games,63 owned an early video game patent
for an “interactive television gaming system.”64 All of the claims reference a
set of “game control circuits”, with the dependent claims elaborating on the
specifics of these circuits.65 The word software does not appear in the pat-
58. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 922 (5th ed. 2011).
59. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2068 (2011) (“[W]e now
hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts con-
stitute patent infringement.”). This decision relied on the Aro II court holding that 271(c)
carries a knowledge component. The Federal Circuit first adopted this approach in Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
60. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“Congress plainly contem-
plated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”).
61. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981) (“We granted certiorari to determine
whether a process . . . which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula
and a programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”).
62. See Alfred P. Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway
Create “Super” Problems for Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or
Copyrighted Software-Related Applications, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 155, 158 (1994).
63. Declan Burrowes, Baer’s Odyssey: Meet the Serial Inventor Who Built the World’s
First Game Console, ARS TECHNICA (July 13, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gam-
ing/2013/07/in-the-beginning-ralph-h-baer-and-the-birth-of-the-game-console/ (“When asked
if [Mr. Baer] feels directly responsible for modern consoles like the Xbox 360 and PlayStation
3, [Mr. Baer’s] answer is clear-cut. ‘Totally.’”).
64. U.S. Patent No. 4,034,990, (issued July 12, 1977) (patent for an “Interactive televi-
sion gaming system.”).
65. Id.
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ent.66 Thus, when the patent was litigated, courts did not have to concern
themselves with the software on those game control circuits.
In this era, the newly created Federal Circuit sidestepped any issues
presented by multiple actors acting in concert in method patents by continu-
ing the component-based analysis espoused in Aro, Aro II, and Wallace.67
For example, consider a patent that claimed a method which produced a
composition.68 The alleged infringer manufactured the apparatus for imple-
menting the method without completing the method itself—the customers
who bought the machine completed the method.69 Because the patent only
covered the entire method, there was no direct infringement resulting from
the sale of the apparatus for either the manufacturer or the purchaser, until
the purchaser actually used the apparatus and completed the processes.70
Under Aro I precedent, there could not be indirect infringement without di-
rect infringement, so selling an apparatus which implemented the patented
method by itself did not give rise to any liability.71 A similar component
analysis approach was used in Magnavox v. Mattel, a case concerning early
home video game consoles.72 Since software was still written to specific
platforms (similar to the Ralph Baer patent supra),73 the court was able to
stop its analysis at the hardware component level—a deeper dive was not
necessary.74 The court ruled that merely selling the game cartridges contrib-
uted to infringement under § 271(c).75 Thus, it was not necessary for the
court to consider the software method implications, even though the
software was a part of the games at issue.76
D. The Doctrine Evolves and Confronts Software (2000–Present)
In this timeframe, the doctrine underwent major changes as courts were
forced to address the problems created by software patents. With the arrival
66. Id.
67. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
68. Id. at 1363.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1374.
71. Id. at 1374-1376 (citing the holdings of Aro I and Aro II).
72. Magnavox Co. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 80 C 4124, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13773 (N.D. Ill.
Jul. 29, 1982).
73. See Ewert & Donner, supra note 62 at 158-159.
74. Magnavox Co., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13773, *68 (However . . . the circuitry of the
[defendant’s product] is in many ways directly analogous to the circuitry of the [plaintiff’s
patent]. The various components listed are merely the circuit components that one would use
once the choice is made to use that particular approach to the design using hardware currently
available.).
75. Id. at *98.
76. Id. at *68 (writing that there is “no software program” present in the digital circuit at
issue).
224 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:215
of cheap microprocessors,77 general purpose hardware became more wide-
spread, and the tight coupling of hardware and hardware-specific software
that had allowed courts to ignore the problems presented in cases like
Magnavox began to disappear.78 Software was no longer targeted for specific
hardware platforms like in Magnavox, and patents involving software began
to be written more generally to reflect this.79 On the legal side, several deci-
sions increased the scope of patentability. The State Street Bank decision
allowed patentability of business methods and anything that produces a use-
ful, concrete and tangible result.80 This decision, endorsed in Bilski v. Kap-
pos,81 combined with the collaborative nature of the Internet and its
burgeoning popularity, created a new wave of software method patents and
related litigation.82 Many of these patents were interactive—they might have
involved a user, a server, and a third party.83 As courts began to confront this
litigation, problems arose with the way that Aro I and Aro II handled the
direct infringement predicate for either inducement or contributory infringe-
ment, and the Federal Circuit decided a new gloss on this was needed in the
decision of BMC v. Paymentech. This gloss imported some aspects of
agency law into patent law, and held that in order for there to be indirect
infringement under either the inducement of § 271(b) or the contributory
infringement of § 271(c), the direct infringement of § 271(a) must be per-
formed by a single entity.84 Unfortunately, this single entity rule had its own
77. Edward Harding, The History of Microprocessors, http://jupiter.plymouth.edu/~har-
ding/historymicro.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“The year 1975 also witnessed a dramatic
lowering of microprocessor prices. At the September WESCON trade show, MOS Technology
created a sensation by offering its 6502 8-bit microprocessor for just $25. At the time, Intel’s
8080 and Motorola’s 6800 had already come down from $360 to $179. Intel and Motorola
immediately dropped their prices to $69.95. By 1980, improved versions of Intel’s 8080 cost
under $5.”).
78. See Ewert & Donner, supra note 62 at 159.
79. See id.
80. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
81. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224 (2010).
82. Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors that Affect Patent Infringement Litigation
Could Help Improve Patent Quality, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-465, (“GAO’s analysis of these data also found
that lawsuits involving software-related patents accounted for about 89 percent of the increase
in defendants over this period.”).
83. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 (issued Jun. 29, 2004). This patent was asserted
by McKesson against Epic. Claim 1 requires users to actually initiate the communication via a
website, connecting the user with their doctor. Id.
84. Even though it contains no mention of the Aro direct infringement prerequisite, the
Federal Circuit found no flaw in the following jury instruction: “When infringement results
from the participation and combined action(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all
joint infringers  and jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a patented process
or method cannot be avoided by having another perform one step of the process or method.
Where the infringement is the result of the participation and combined action(s) of one or more
persons or entities, they are joint infringers and are jointly liable for the infringement.” On
Fall 2013] Interactive Methods and Collaborative Performance 225
problems as well, and the Federal Circuit ultimately removed this rule in
Akamai.85
Additionally, the introduction of the Internet created a unique set of
problems because it provided an infringing environment unlike any other.86
Suddenly, millions of semi-anonymous users could utilize an infringing
website. As such, many advocated indirect infringement as the only reasona-
ble means of confronting infringement on such a wide scale, since direct
infringement, with its strict liability component, would sweep up numerous
innocent end users.87
As patent law began to confront software and contributory infringement,
courts looked to the doctrine of indirect infringement in copyright law. Cop-
yright law had already wrestled with the issue of indirect infringement and
the Internet in the file sharing cases.88 As a result, these copyright cases
gained new importance in the realm of patent law. The Supreme Court based
their analysis in the file sharing cases entirely on the intent standards for
indirect patent infringement.89 While this mixing of patent and copyright law
may seem odd, after expressing its view that inducement in the patent sphere
carried a heavy requirement of intent, the Court explicitly imported this view
of patent inducement into copyright law.90 Thus, based on this copyright law
decision, the Court held that liability in patent law for inducement must
come from conduct that is clearly purposeful.91 Later in Akamai, the Federal
Circuit would take note of these pronouncements on copyright infringe-
ment.92 The court stated that the file sharing cases provided valuable direc-
tion and ascertained when it is proper to hold an individual accountable for
Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The
Federal Circuit later repudiated this as dicta in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498
F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007), although both the majority in Akamai Technologies., Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and Judge Newman’s dissent cite it.
85. Akamai, 692 F.3d.
86. See Keith E. Witek, Software Patent Infringement on the Internet and on Modern
Computer Systems—Who Is Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 303, 306 (1998).
87. E.g., id. at 383.
88. See Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930
(2005); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). These
cases are collectively called the filing sharing cases.
89. Richard J. Stark & Andrei Harasymiak, Inducement of Patent Infringement: The
Intent Standard and Circumstantial Evidence of Intent, 2011 Edition, in RECENT TRENDS IN
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING RECENT CASES
AND CONSTRUCTING EFFECTIVE DEFENSE STRATEGIES *5  (Feb. 2011), available at 2011 WL
601766 (“Accordingly, the Court justified. . . its decision in Grokster by articulating its view
of indirect infringement in patent law, and then applying the resulting doctrine to copyright
law.”).
90. Id. at *6-7.
91. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.
92. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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the actions of another, alluding to the well-developed tort doctrine of respon-
deat superior.93 This tort law contour allows courts to consider potential lia-
bility where other actors perform steps of a method patent on an alleged
infringer’s behalf.94 However, under the single entity rule of BMC, the com-
mon law test of agency still needs to apply to the vicarious actors.95 This test
is rarely met in the interactive world of the Internet.96
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit began to apply this copyright law
agency principle in patent infringement cases.97 For example, consider a
method used to stabilize and align the bones of a patient’s spine.98 The sur-
geons that implemented the final steps of the method by actually working on
a patient were not common law agents of the manufacturer of the spinal
screws. Courts found this failure to demonstrate an agent-relationship suffi-
cient to raise a question regarding surgeon liability, even though the sur-
geons’ actions appear to be infringement.99
The 2007 case of BMC v. Paymentech emphasized the extent to which
the Federal Circuit preferred agency-driven analysis in § 271(c) by creating
the single entity rule.100 In BMC, the patent at issue claimed a method for
processing debit transactions without a Personal Identification Number
(PIN), and required the combined action of several actors, including the
payee’s agent, the financial institutions which issued the debit card, and a
remote payment network.101 Various actors completed each step of the pat-
ent.102 However, the defendant did not control, or cause to be controlled, the
financial institutions or the ATM network.103 In order to find infringement,
the court needed to identify “‘some connection’ between [the defendant] and
the firms taking the additional claimed steps.”104 Essentially, this required a
connection that rose to the level of a common-law agency relationship. Cit-
ing the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Federal Circuit noted “the law
93. Id. at 1332.
94. See Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Cross Medical argues that the situation is analogous to those in which courts
have found a party to directly infringe a method claim when a step of the claim is performed at
the direction of, but not by, that party.”).
95. See generally BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“This court acknowledges that the standard requiring control or direction for a finding
of joint infringement may in some circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agree-
ments to avoid infringement.”).
96. For example, nearly all users of Facebook are not agents of the company itself
(except those users who also happen to be employees of Facebook).
97. See, e.g., DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303-1306 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (discussing the Grokster decision and its effect on patent law).
98. Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1297.
99. Id. at 1311.
100. BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d 1373.
101. Id. at 1375.
102. Id. at 1381.
103. Id. at 1382.
104. Id. at 1378.
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imposes vicarious liability on a party for the acts of another in circumstances
showing that the liable party controlled the conduct of the acting party.”105
Finding no such circumstances, the court granted summary judgment to the
defendant.106 The court acknowledged that this approach created a potential
loophole for agreements where neither party is an agent of the other, but
decided to live with this loophole rather than increase the liability reach of
direct infringement.107 This case created what became known as the single
entity rule, which requires each step of the patent to have been conducted
under the control or direction of a single entity in order for liability to
attach.108
In a particularly damaging decision for interactive method patents, the
Federal Circuit later elaborated on the single entity rule in Muniauction, Inc.
v. Thomson Corp.109 The patent at issue involved an integrated auction sys-
tem for bonds, located on a single server that allowed issuers to run the
auction and bidders to prepare and submit bids using a conventional web
browser.110 The court noted that its own decision in BMC had created a new
legal proposition: what eventually became known as the single entity theory
of indirect infringement.111 Since the bidders were not under the control of
the defendant using the traditional agency law definition, the Federal Circuit
found no infringement, despite the patent itself being infringed in the ab-
stract.112 The Muniauction holding has dire implications for the many
software method patents which have a host-user component. Since most
host-user relations are traditional arms-length relationships, the relationships
between the infringing entities do not satisfy any kind of control or agency
standard.113 Thus, any type of claim which necessitates a finding of divided
infringement is essentially unenforceable, unless of course one of the parties
is naı̈ve enough to assert an agency level of control over the other.
The case of Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., in
which a district court applied the BMC and Muniauction precedent, exempli-
105. Id. at 1379.
106. Id. at 1378-81.
107. Id. at 1381.
108. See, e.g., Method Claims and the “Single-Entity Rule” – Headed for En Banc Re-
assessment?, COATS & BENNET, P.L.L.C. (Apr. 13, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://coatsandbennett.
com/our-blog/method-claims-and-the-single-entity-rule-headed-for-en-banc-re-assessment
(“First articulated in BMC. . .this single entity rule. . .”).
109. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
110. Id. at 1321-22.
111. Id. at 1328-29.
112. Id. at 1328-1330.
113. See, e.g., Darren M. Franklin, Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp.: The Federal
Circuit Again Weighs In On Software Patents, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW BLOG (Oct. 7,
2008), http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/archives/patents-muniauction-inc-v-
thompson-corp-the-federal-circuit-again-weighs-in-on-software-patents.html (“[T]he Federal
Circuit has left little room for a theory of joint infringement that requires actions by multiple
entities that are related only as host-user.”).
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fies the ease with which method patents can be directly infringed without
consequence under the single entity rule.114 The defendants were two
software companies. One company produced patient information software
and the other produced dispatch software.115 The patent at issue concerned a
method that required the integration of patient information with dispatch in-
formation.116 The two companies had agreed to bundle their software and
sell it together.117 However, in their contract the companies were equal play-
ers, neither agent of the other, and thus the court found no common-law
agency relationship.118 Holding that the single entity rule was not met, the
court overturned a jury verdict finding infringement.119
This bifurcated approach, where patents on methods are uniquely vul-
nerable to an agency law runaround, neither incentivizes inventors nor gives
any better notice of the patent’s scope to the public in general.120 Because of
the Federal Circuit precedents of BMC and Muniauction, patented methods
that can be performed by multiple actors are now difficult to enforce. Like
Mercoid before the 1952 Patent Act, BMC and Muniauction have drastically
limited the scope of validly granted patents. Like the 1952 Patent Act, a
similarly drastic solution is needed to remedy this issue. Unfortunately,
Akamai is not the solution.
II. POLICY FACTORS AND STAKEHOLDERS OF AKAMAI-MCKESSON
The outcome of Golden Hour demonstrated that the single entity rule
announced in BMC and expanded upon in Muniauction lessened the enforce-
ability of interactive methods in an indirect infringement context. This line
of cases essentially neutered the doctrine of indirect infringement for
software patentees—the loopholes presented by agency law and arm’s
length contracting were too easy to exploit. Before discussing the outcome
of Akamai and the possible future after that decision, it is useful to consider
the policy interests advocating for particular interpretative changes to indi-
rect infringement jurisprudence. Four different viewpoints are considered
here: (1) consumers, (2) companies favoring continuance of the single entity
rule, (3) companies that disfavor the single entity rule because of the loop-
holes it presents, and (4) academic interests. The Electronic Frontier Foun-
114. Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 2009 WL 943273 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
3, 2009).
115. Id. at *1-2.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *3 (“The evidence at trial showed that [defendants] had a non-exclusive dis-
tributorship agreement that lasted about a year. The agreement defined the relationship as not
creating ‘any agency, partnership, joint venture, or employer/employee relationship.’”).
118. Id. at *4.
119. Id. at *5.
120. Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV.
72, 120 (2012).
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dation represents consumer interests.121 Cisco Systems and Facebook
represent the interests of those in favor of the single entity rule.122 Myriad
Genetics and pharmaceutical interests generally represent the interests of
those against the single entity rule.123 Finally, the American Intellectual
Property Law Association represents academic interests.124
A. Consumers and Innocent Third Parties
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) is a consumer group repre-
senting the public interest on the Internet and in other areas of technology.125
The EFF is particularly concerned about the effect of indirect infringement
on end users and believes that overruling BMC and Muniauction in favor of
a rule that more easily attaches liability to third-party users could have far-
reaching consequences on innovation and technological advances.126 Be-
cause of direct infringement’s strict liability nature and possibility to ensnare
innocent end users, the EFF cautions against expanding direct infringe-
ment.127 To the EFF, economics and fundamental fairness dictate that an
unsuspecting third party should not bear the costs of potential infringe-
ment.128 The EFF also indicates that litigation targeting the unsuspecting
third party has been and will be brought even though the third party may not
have deep pockets.129 Expanding indirect infringement to encompass third-
party users would mean that anyone could be liable simply by using a partic-
ular website, or downloading an approved development kit from a manufac-
turer.130 If a patent for an online bidding system (similar to Muniauction)
were to be asserted against a company like eBay, potentially anyone who
121. About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/about (last vis-
ited Nov. 27, 2013) (“From the beginning, EFF has championed the public interest in every
critical battle affecting digital rights.”).
122. See infra Part II.B.
123. See infra Part II.C.
124. See infra Part II.D.
125. About EFF, supra note 121 (“Blending the expertise of lawyers, policy analysts,
activists, and technologists, EFF achieves significant victories on behalf of consumers and the
general public.”).
126. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 2-3, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (2012) (No.
2009-1372).
127. Id. at 3-4.
128. Id. at 4.
129. See id. at 7.
130. E.g., Julie Samuels, Apple Should Stand Up and Defend Its Developers, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (May 20, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/05/apple-
should-stand-up. Defendants each developed applications for Apple’s iPhone, using technol-
ogy provided by and indeed mandated by Apple. Lodsys provided a license to Apple but that
license might not be extended to developers.
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listed items, sold items, bought items, or even viewed items,131 could be
liable for patent infringement. The EFF is wary of such a world.132
B. Maintaining the Single Entity Rule
Despite the fact that many software companies hold method patents,
most software amici are in favor of the continuance of the rule as it is out-
lined in BMC: each step of the patent must be done at the control or direction
of a single entity in order to find infringement.133 Since so few method pat-
ents actually reach the single entity standard for direct infringement, many
software companies have relied on the BMC precedent to fight off prospec-
tive litigation by patent assertion entities.134 This type of prospective litiga-
tion typically involves major competitors in a market (such as smart
phones), which are all sued for a common feature.135 Under the possible new
contributory regime these amici are advocating against, this would be a
multi-step collaborative claim wherein the final steps are taken by the users
of the smartphone (or some other device or website). The overturn of the
single entity rule would separate the act from the actor and create liability
for those using less than the full-patented method.
Additionally, overturning the single entity rule would create compli-
cated legal issues arising from multi-actor infringement theories.136 For ex-
ample, how should damages be calculated for an entity that only practices
some but not all steps of a method claim? If greater damages are appropriate
for an entity that practices the “novel” steps of a claim, which steps are the
novel ones? Alternatively, if the damages would be determined via a mul-
131. This of course depends on the reach of the claims in the patent, but it is easy to
imagine a patent which covers all aspects of an online bidding marketplace, including viewing
of listed items.
132. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 4, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (2012) (No. 2009-1372)
(“[T]he policies underlying the imposition of strict liability do not reach to third parties, who
likely will not benefit from the notice function of the patent that they allegedly infringe. As
such, economics and fundamental fairness dictate that an unsuspecting third party should not
bear the costs of potential infringement.”).
133. E.g., Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc. et al as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 1-3, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d
1301 (2012) (No. 2009-1372).
134. Id. at 1.
135. This type of litigation might be less common after the American Invents Act. See
Michael Liu, Note, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions
Away From Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489 (2012) (discussing
joinder under the AIA as a tool as against opportunistic litigants).
136. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc. et al as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents at 4-5, Akamai Techs., Inc.v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (2012)
(No. 2009-1372).
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tiparty hypothetical negotiation,137 how would such a negotiation be simu-
lated? These questions barely scratch the surface of the complexities
involved in calculating damages in multi-actor infringement scenarios.138
Software companies participate in an industry that inherently leads to multi-
actor joint infringement scenarios, especially where software provides some
service to an end user over the Internet. This state of affairs invites these
complicated damages theories, which could create “a recipe for unbounded
and disproportionate liability.”139 The software industry believes overturning
the single entity rule established in BMC and the following cases will create
a “legal labyrinth,”140 and there is no such support in the common law for
imputing the acts of an unrelated third party to be the acts of the defendant in
patent law.141
C. Overturning the Single Entity Rule
The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries aim to “[strengthen]
the U.S. patent system and [protect] the public interest in the issuance of
enforceable patents.”142 The biotechnology industry relies on proprietary
processes and method patents extensively, and considers this intellectual
property to be their most valuable asset.143 A biotech company makes money
from consumers paying for the right to use processes or the products result-
ing from said process; a software company makes money from consumers
using their processes for free. Accordingly, software companies are not as
concerned about the methods or process underlying their product.
Since the single entity rule creates a loophole permitting actors acting in
concert, as discussed in Part I.C supra, the biotechnology and pharmaceuti-
cal industries are completely against the continuance of the single entity
rule. Both of these industries still find one prerequisite appropriate for indi-
rect infringement: the method or processes accused of allegedly infringing a
patent must meet the all-elements rule — all the steps of the claim must be
performed.144 This is simply the oft-repeated Aro precedent in another guise.
137. See Ga. Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp 1116 (SD NY 1970) (dis-
cussing a hypothetical negotiation as one part of the multi-factor test to determine damages in
a patent lawsuit).
138. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc. et al as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, supra note 136, at 5-6 (discussing the complexity of multi-actor infringement
damages).
139. Id. at 6.
140. Id. at 24.
141. Brief for Facebook, Inc. & LinkedIn Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 3, Akamai Techs., Inc., et al. vs. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (2012) (No. 2009-
1372).
142. Amicus Curiae Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of Neither
Party as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Akamai Techs., Inc., et al. vs. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (2012) (No. 2009-1372), 2011 WL 3101890, at *2.
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *29.
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For Myriad Genetics, the single entity rule “eviscerates a large number of
method patent claims . . . [and] significantly weakens the U.S. patent sys-
tem.”145 For the life sciences, patents often represent a large investment in
both time and money. Removing the single entity rule helps these companies
recoup some of their investment with a fully enforceable patent.
D. Academic Interests
The American Industry Property Law Association (AIPLA), not relying
on any industry-specific positions, believes that the single entity rule is
based on incorrect statutory construction of § 271.146 In an argument largely
accepted by Judge Newman in her dissent,147 AIPLA asserts that the “who-
ever” in the statute can apply to multiple actors, and that the addition of
agency principles dilutes the traditional tort basis of patent infringement.148
The tort basis for patent infringement is significant. Prior to the introduction
of the single entity rule, the case law concerning infringement relied on tort
law principles.149 AIPLA believes the addition of agency law has created
loopholes which drastically reduce the scope of validly issued patents by
allowing sophisticated legal entities to escape patent law.150 As many have
noted, the single entity rule renders certain valid patents “practically uninfr-
ingeable.”151 Based on this proposition, AIPLA argues that agency law
should be removed from patent infringement and courts should instead look
to its traditional basis in tort law, which does not have joint tortfeasor is-
sues.152 The Federal Circuit considered these concerns in Akamai.153
III. A LOOPHOLE CLOSED, NEW GAPS CREATED
In Akamai, the Federal Circuit overturned the single entity rule for indi-
rect infringement in an extremely fractured opinion, decided by only a slim
majority, which removed the Aro precedent of direct infringement as a pred-
icate for indirect infringement. This section will discuss two components of
145. Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Myriad Genetics, Inc. in Support of Neither Party
at 3, McKesson Techs., Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., Inc., 463 Fed.Appx. 906, (2011) (No. 2010-
1291).
146. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Sup-
port of Reversal, But in Support of Neither Party, McKesson Techs., Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp.,
Inc., No. 2010-1291 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2011), 2011 WL 3101832, at *1-2.
147. See Part III.D.
148. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support
of Reversal, But in Support of Neither Party, supra note 146, at *2.
149. See id. at *11.
150. See id. at *2.
151. Damon Gupta, Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection Under
the Single Entity Rule, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 61 (2012).
152. See Brief for American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, supra note 146, at *15.
153. Judge Newman’s dissent incorporates much of AIPLA’s viewpoint. See infra Part
III.D.
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the opinion: the majority opinion and Judge Newman’s dissent. Judge Lynn
also dissented, but merely advocated following the precedent of BMC and
Muniauction, so that dissent is not discussed. A roundup of scholars’ criti-
ques of the decision is also included, noting various effects of the decision
upon the legal landscape.
In Akamai, the Federal Circuit actually combined two different cases
from two different defendants—Epic Systems (with plaintiff McKesson) and
Limelight (with plaintiff Akamai).154 Both of the patents at issue in Akamai
concerned method software patents, in which the steps of the methods were
divided between various parties.155 Defendant Limelight’s infringing use
consisted of a content delivery service to content providers’ web pages
where end users outside the control of Defendant Limelight modified their
web pages themselves.156 Accordingly, the final step of the patented method
was conducted by individual users. In a similar fact pattern, Defendant Epic
created an application called MyChart that infringed on McKesson’s patent
covering a method of electronic communication between healthcare provid-
ers and patients.157 In Defendant Epic’s case, Defendant Epic did not per-
form any steps of the patent. Instead, the steps were divided between
healthcare providers (licensed users of MyChart) and patients (not Epic’s
direct customers).158
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Akamai overturned the single entity rule estab-
lished in BMC v. Paymentech. Recognizing the distinction between direct
infringement and direct infringement by a single entity,159 the court was dis-
missive of its own BMC decision:
It would be a bizarre result to hold someone liable for inducing
another to perform all of the steps of a method claim but to hold
harmless one who goes further by actually performing some of the
steps himself.160
After this quick dismissal, the majority stated that criminal and tort vicarious
liability analogies should inform the standard for inducement under
§ 271(b), and that there was no such thing as “attempted infringement.”161
According to Aro, a finding of direct infringement was still necessary, but a






159. Id. at 1308.
160. Id. at 1309.
161. Id. at 1308.
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single actor no longer needed to directly infringe.162 The court concluded
that the BMC and Muniauction line of cases improperly applied the standard
announced under Aro, which created a method of “knowingly sidestep[ping]
infringement liability” that Congress did not endorse in the creation of the
1952 Patent Act.163
After Akamai, a plaintiff can succeed on an induced liability claim if: (1)
the defendant knew of plaintiff’s patent, (2) defendant induced the perform-
ance of the steps of the method in the patent, and (3) those steps were actu-
ally performed.164 This third step does not require a traditional showing of
direct infringement.165 Curiously, the issue the parties were required to brief
(whether a court can find direct infringement when no single entity performs
all of the claim steps of the patent) was not resolved; instead, the Akamai
court considered the issue “not necessary.”166
B. Commentary
Reaction to the decision has been mixed, but generally favorable. Pro-
fessor Dennis Crouch notes the decision “closes a major loophole” by no
longer allowing “entities to knowingly and intentionally take advantage of a
patented invention while avoiding the need to take a license.”167 The end
result is a “mixed blessing.”168 The “use of active inducement . . . is a gain”
but the confusion regarding divided direct infringement under § 271(a) as a
prerequisite leaves uncertainty in the system.169 However, the court’s deci-
sion did appease the EFF by ensuring that third-party infringers are not po-
tentially liable.170 Additionally, the court did not address the primary reason
for review in the first place: the issue of divided direct infringement.171
162. Id. at 1316.
163. Id. at 1318.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1319 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The majority further holds that only the ‘in-
ducer’ is liable for divided infringement, and that the direct infringers are not liable although
the patent rights are ‘plainly being violated by the actors’ joint conduct.’”).
166. Id. at 1306 (“It is not necessary for us to resolve [the briefed issue] today because
we find that these cases and cases like them can be resolved through an application of the
doctrine of induced infringement.”).
167. Dennis Crouch, Joint Infringement: Federal Circuit Changes the Law of Induce-
ment, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/joint-infringe-
ment-federal-circuit-changes-the-law-of-inducement.html. Professor Crouch maintains the
Patently-O blog.
168. Janis & Holbrook, supra note 120, at 119.
169. See id. at 119-120.
170. See Michael Barclay, Federal Circuit Decides Joint Liability Issue—By Deciding
Something Else, IPDUCK (Sept. 1, 2012), http://ipduck.blogspot.com/2012/09/federal-circuit-
decides-joint-liability.html (Michael Barclay is also writer of the EFF Amicus brief).
171. Id. (writing that the decision “did not resolve the issue of joint or divided DIRECT
infringement.”).
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However, Professor Timothy Holbrook observed an unforeseen side ef-
fect of removing direct infringement as a predicate to inducement: the ma-
jority created a new category for inducement completely apart from direct
infringement.172 This decouples the territorial requirement of § 271(a)
(“within this country”) from § 271(b), creating an extraterritoriality problem
where § 271(b) is no longer necessarily tied to activities within the United
States.173
C. After Akamai
Since this was an en banc decision overturning precedent with a slim
majority, many commentators believe that Supreme Court will grant certio-
rari.174 In March of 2013, Epic and McKesson settled their portion of the
lawsuit, and Epic withdrew any further appeals in exchange for a license to
the patent at issue.175 However, Akamai’s petition for certiorari is still pend-
ing.176 At the end of the October 2012 term this past June, the Court invited
the U.S. Solicitor General to brief the Court on the government’s views in a
Call for the Views of Solicitor General (“CVSG”).177 This generally means
the Court views the case as “sufficiently important,” and further indicates
that the Court is considering the case closely.178
172. Mike Masnic, Appeals Court Says Companies Can Be Guilty of Inducing Infringe-
ment. . . Even if There Is No Direct Infringement, TECHDIRT (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.
techdirt.com/articles/20120831/12080220232/appeals-court-says-companies-can-be-guilty-in-
ducing-infringement-even-if-there-is-no-direct-infringement.html.
173. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of
Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 501 (2012) (“This state of affairs may change dramati-
cally after Akamai. There, the Federal Circuit decoupled active inducement from § 271(a),
meaning that infringement under § 271(b) is free-standing, and infringement is not defined by
reference to other provisions of § 271.).
174. See, e.g., Kevin E. Noonan, Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.
and McKesson Technologies, Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc), PATENT
DOCS (Sept. 04, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/09/akamai-technologies-inc-v-lime-
light-networks-inc-and-mckesson-technologies-inc-v-epic-systems-corp-f.html (“[I]t is un-
likely that the Supreme Court will deny certiorari in a case of statutory construction where the
Federal Circuit is so plainly fractured.”).
175. Press Release, McKesson Corp., McKesson and Epic Settle Patent Infringement Lit-
igation (Mar. 4, 2013), available at http://www.mckesson.com/about-mckesson/newsroom/
press-releases/2013/mckesson-and-epic-settle-patent-infringement-litigation/. Although the
press release did not mention any monetary compensation, it is likely that Epic paid a fair
amount to end the litigation.
176. Docket for 12-960, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.
supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-960.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013)
(listing the most recent developments in Akamai’s petition for certiorari).
177. High Court’s End of Term Actions on IP Cert Petitions: Akamai CVSG, Pay-for-
Delay GVR, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 25, 2013), http://www.bna.com/high-courts-end-
n17179874765/.
178. Lisa McElroy, “CVSG”s in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 10, 2010, 10:15
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/last-week-in-plain-english-2/.
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Limelight’s Supreme Court petition presents a perfect encapsulation of
the errors in the Akamai decision: “Whether the Federal Circuit erred in
holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed direct infringe-
ment under § 271(a).”179 The petition, of course, answers that question with
an affirmative.
The Supreme Court has a recent history of rejecting Federal Circuit
tests.180 Given this history, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Akamai,
the current rule—a judicially created inducement rule without direct in-
fringement—will likely fall like prior Federal Circuit tests. In such a scena-
rio, it will be up to the Supreme Court and not the Federal Circuit to craft a
proper indirect infringement rule.
Courts and other commentators have stated that perhaps better claim
drafting is a way around the morass caused by indirect infringement and
interactive methods.181 The Akamai court, among others, disagrees:182 “[T]he
presence or absence of infringement should not depend on cleverness or luck
to satisfy a malleable single entity rule.”183 It is naı̈ve to suggest that some
claims can be drafted such that a single entity rule is met since any patent
providing some sort of service to a user over the Internet will inherently
involve at least the service provider and the user.
D. Dissent of Judge Newman
In her dissent, Judge Newman was very critical of the majority, finding
that “[the majority decision] raises new issues . . . and contains vast potential
for abuse . . . . [This] appeal can readily be resolved under existing law.”184
Relying on the language of § 271(a), Judge Newman explained that the sin-
gle entity rule (or the new inducement rule of the majority) was unnecessary
because the word “whoever” in § 271(a) “embraces the singular and the plu-
ral.”185  Infringement should not depend on “how many people it takes to
179. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Akamai Techs., Inc. (No. 12-960). Structuring the
question in this manner highlights the issue with Aro I and Aro II precedent.
180. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for determining patent subject matter
eligibility); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the strict appli-
cation of the Federal Circuit’s teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine test in obvi-
ousness cases).
181. See, e.g., BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272-75
(2005) (writing that it should be “straightforward” to draft unitary claims).
182. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2012); e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980) (cautioning
that “the technicalities of patent law” should not enable persons “to profit from another’s
invention” by performing “acts designed to facilitate infringement by others”).
183. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1325.
184. Id. at 1319 (Newman, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1322 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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perform a patented method” because an important “keystone” of patent law
is the ability to exclude “others”—not only a single entity—from utilizing
the invention.186 Judge Newman prefers a divided direct infringement rule,
wherein once divided direct infringement has been recognized, liability for
the divided direct infringement can be analyzed in a fact specific manner.187
Judge Newman agreed with the majority that the single entity rule had
no support in precedent,188 but took issue with the majority’s holding of indi-
rect infringement via inducement with no direct infringement prerequisite.189
Regarding the majority’s construction of indirect infringement, tort, and
criminal law, Judge Newman wrote:
The court has fractured into two flawed positions, each a departure
from established precedent, each poorly suited to the issues and
technologies that dominate today’s commerce. Today’s new rule of
inducement-only liability serves no public interest, no innovation
need. The consequences for the technology communities are uncer-
tainty, disincentive, and new potential for abuse.190
This language clearly shows the undesirable effects of Akamai: a decision
unsupported by precedent and fraught with negative consequences.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT RIGHT, NO MORE,
NO LESS
Problems of divided direct infringement, where end users complete the
final method of a patented step, and indirect infringement are not going
away. Method patents are no less deserving of protection than any other type
of patent—after all they protect “some of the most important industrial de-
velopments of our age.”191 In Akamai, the majority created a new three step
test for indirect infringement liability: (1) the defendant must know of plain-
tiff’s patent, (2) the defendant must induce the performance of the steps of
the method in the patent, and (3) the plaintiff must prove those steps were
actually performed.192 With the third step not requiring any form of actual
direct infringement under § 271(a), Akamai does not solve any problems in
186. Id. at 1323 (Newman, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1330-1332 (Newman, J., dissenting) (When the several steps of a process
claim are performed by more than one entity, whether the entities operate under common
direction or control, or jointly or independently or interactively, remedy for infringement is
appropriately allocated based on established criteria of culpability, benefit, and the like.”).
188. Id. at 1325 (Newman, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1328 (Newman, J., dissenting) (writing that the majority has created a
“quandary”).
190. Id. at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting).
191. John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1251-52
(2011).
192. Id.
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the divided direct infringement or indirect infringement arena. Quite the op-
posite, Akamai likely exacerbates the issue with this three step test by
decoupling § 271(a) from § 271(b) and § 271(c)—an approach that is
against the precedent of Aro and removes the “within this country” limita-
tion of § 271(a).193 A proper approach would restore § 271(a) direct in-
fringement as a prerequisite for §§ 271(b) and (c) liability, but not allow
divided direct infringement liability under § 271(a) absent meeting the sin-
gle entity rule.
The solution to the problem of finding liability for multi-actor infringe-
ment of method patents needs to be judicially constructed. As discussed pre-
viously, indirect infringement began its doctrinal life as a judicial
construction; the 1952 Patent Law Act merely codified it. Congress recently
had the opportunity to change § 271(b) and § 271(c) in the America Invents
Act.194 Investigation of the legislative history of the Act shows no discussion
of these issues, and infringement itself is only passingly mentioned.195 Thus,
the burden is on courts to come up with the appropriate remedy for interac-
tive method claim infringement by multiple actors. In the enactment of the
1952 Patent Act, a rational Congress could not have intended enforcement
for method patents to be lacking.
First, the Court should recognize that the “whoever” of § 271(a) can be
multiple actors, per Judge Newman’s dissent in Akamai.196 Therefore, di-
vided direct infringement (under § 271(a)) should be a prerequisite finding
for liability under either § 271(b) or § 271(c). Unless the single entity rule is
met, in cases where courts find divided direct infringement, culpable parties
should be identified by their intent to induce infringement under § 271(b) or
contribute to it under § 271(c). For divided direct infringement liability
under § 271(a), the single entity rule should be required to be met. Judge
Newman’s dissent argues that liability under her proposed system would be
apportioned based on “the particular case,” leaving courts to judicially deter-
mine each and every time which actors are appropriately included in a patent
infringement case.197 Instead, this approach advocates for the resurrection of
the single entity rule. This would allow for strict liability in the “mas-
termind” cases, where one actor controls the actions of others and their col-
lective actions infringe a patent. Limiting the single entity rule to § 271(a)
193. See supra Part I.
194. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011).
195. See, e.g., COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA
INVENTS ACT (Patrick A. Doody ed., 2012), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Practices/
AIA_LegislativeHistory_final.pdf. The discussion concerning the Act is primarily focused on
the switch to first-to-file.
196. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Newman, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.B.
197. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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fits with patent law’s roots in tort law as well as the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
Next, while correct in its formulation of “whoever” in § 271(a), Judge
Newman’s dissent is not without its problems and it should not be adopted
entirely. As noted by the EFF,198 Judge Newman’s dissent opens potential
liability to far too many actors. Judge Newman noted that “experience
makes clear that the target is the deep-pocket commercial participant.”199
This may have been true in the time of Aro and similar component based
cases. How would one identify the customers who specifically bought the
fabric top and the car? But in today’s era, where Internet Service Providers
are routinely subpoenaed for the identity of users in copyright cases,200 it is
not at all far-fetched that customers themselves could be found liable. For
example, the holder of a patent on an interactive method infringed by
Facebook could request the IP addresses of users who used the particular
functionality. This would “ensnare innocent actors” placing “an undue bur-
den on the courts to cut them free.”201 Protection is clearly needed for these
innocent actors, and this is why the intent standard for inducement under
§ 271(b) is proper. In particular, courts should continue to require specific
knowledge of the patent. Specific knowledge of the patent maintains prece-
dent under § 271(b) and § 271(c) and keeps innocent end users out of the
reach of patent law.
Turning to the Akamai majority, courts should follow a modified version
of the three-step test from Akamai. The first two steps are generally the
same. First, the defendant must know of the plaintiff’s patent. Next, in a
slight expansion, the defendant must either induce performance of (for
§ 271(b)) or contribute to the infringement of (for § 271(c)) the patent. Fi-
nally, in the third step, rather than proving that the steps of the patent must
be performed, the plaintiff must prove that, somewhere, § 271(a) direct in-
fringement has occurred. This § 271(a) infringement can be either the di-
vided direct infringement (with Judge Newman’s definition of whoever
discussed supra) or traditional direct infringement. In the original holding of
Akamai (besides involving only § 271(b)), the third step involved making a
showing that all steps of the patent were performed, not mentioning § 271(a)
or direct infringement at all. If the Akamai majority had intended § 271(a) to
be a predicate for § 271(b) and § 271(c), they would have explicitly in-
cluded language indicating this intention. That they did not do so is an une-
quivocal decoupling of the connection between direct and indirect
198. See Barclay, supra note 170.
199. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting).
200. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, “Look, You May Hate Me:” 90 Minutes with John Steele,
Porn Troll, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 21, 2013, 9:34 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/
05/look-you-may-hate-me-90-minutes-with-john-steele-prenda-porn-troll/2/.
201. W. Keith Robinson, No ‘Direction’ Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint In-
fringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 100 (2012).
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infringement.202 By removing § 271(a) and its “within this country” require-
ment, the Akamai decision introduced a new foreign activity loophole to
patent infringement cases which plaintiffs can exploit, as well as uncertainty
into the system by upending all indirect infringement case law interpreting
the 1952 Patent Act. This state of affairs must be fixed.
Thus, making direct infringement a prerequisite for § 271(a) for
§ 271(b) and § 271(c) solves this problem. It fixes the troubling precedential
problem of Aro and moves case law back in line with post-1952 decisions.
After all, it would be improper to engender infringement liability merely by
encouraging infringement in the absence of some form of direct infringe-
ment. Restoring direct infringement as a requirement for indirect infringe-
ment in the third step also solves the extraterritorial problem created when
the court decoupled § 271(a) from § 271(b), by bringing back the “in this
country” requirement of § 271(a).203 By not making § 271(a) an explicit re-
quirement for § 271(b), the majority opened a new loophole for actions done
outside the United States. Restoring § 271(a) to its rightful place as an indi-
rect infringement predicate closes this loophole.
This solution, when viewed in total, closes present loopholes in patent
infringement liability. When an entity controls another, the single entity rule
is met and the mastermind shall be liable under § 271(a). In other cases,
where there is divided direct infringement (under § 271(a)) but the single
entity rule is not met, § 271(b) and/or § 271(c) can be pursued. In the words
of Giles Rich, then advising Congress on the 1952 Patent Act, “wherever
there is contributory infringement there is somewhere something called di-
rect infringement, and to that direct infringement someone has contrib-
uted.”204 This approach also comports much better with the precedent of Aro
and subsequent cases, as well as restoring the “in this country” limitation of
§ 271(a) not present in § 271(b) or § 271(c) and therefore limiting extraterri-
torial effects. Finally, by removing actors from the realm of divided direct
infringement liability in the absence of the single entity rule, innocent actors
are spared the rigors and expense of a patent trial. However, this solution
ensures that the courts can still recognize that “somewhere” direct infringe-
ment has occurred, and can then focus the judicial inquiry on § 271(b) or
§ 271(c) liability for the proper actor.
202. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1329 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“To support its unprecedented
ruling of induced infringement without direct infringers, the court also misconstrues the 1952
Patent Act and its history.”).
203. See Holbrook, supra note 173.
204. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 151 (1951) (statement of Giles S. Rich,
Esq.)
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CONCLUSION
Since its creation, the courts have approached the doctrine of indirect
infringement with varied treatment. The modern method patents of today
were not envisaged by the Aro Court, by the drafters of the 1952 Act, nor by
the court confronting infringing lamp and chimney manufacturers in Wal-
lace. The component-based analysis of § 271(c) case law shows that
§ 271(c) is ill-equipped to deal with modern method patents. The Internet
has given rise to possible infringement on a scale that scholars even as late
as the 1990s could only begin to imagine. Internet users numbering in the
millions can easily contribute to infringement of an interactive or collabora-
tive method patent. At the same time, the Federal Circuit’s single entity rule
has allowed actors to avoid liability by not exercising direction or control, an
easy loophole with millions of dispersed users. Finally, Akamai has an-
nounced a new standard for indirect infringement, but has disturbed almost
all of the modern era indirect infringement doctrine and has opened geo-
graphic loopholes by removing the direct infringement prerequisite.205
The better approach is to make a finding of direct infringement, be it
either divided or traditional, a prerequisite for liability under § 271(b) and
§ 271(c). This comports with the precedent of Aro and closes any geographi-
cal loopholes. But for various public policy reasons, the Court should not go
so far as to extend divided direct infringement liability to all parties as advo-
cated in Judge Newman’s Akamai dissent. This would open far too many
innocent users to infringement and create a mess for courts to disentangle. A
culpable party will be evidenced by their intent to infringe. Finally, the sin-
gle entity rule should continue to be a prerequisite for a finding of § 271(a)
liability when multiple actors are involved. If the single entity is not met, a
plaintiff can seek redress either through § 271(b) or § 271(c), with a show-
ing of knowledge of the patent, contribution to or inducement of infringe-
ment of the patent, and a showing of divided direct infringement.
In conclusion, this approach enables patentees to properly utilize their
patents by providing a judicially created construction for enforcement, keeps
case law in line with Aro precedent and the intent of the 1952 Patent Act
drafters, and prevents innocent third-party infringers from being liable for
damages.
205. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1328 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he court holds that there
need not be direct infringers.”).
